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   This paper deals with the engineering capability of a developing country. 
But what is the engineering capability of a country ? Here we tentatively define 
the term as the social capability of a country to design and construct various 
machinery and systems constituted from machinery. Modern industrial 
technology is largely embodied in a system of machines, each of which embodies 
a subsystem of the technology. 
   Usually the transfer of manufacturing technology to a developing country 
starts with the importation of a full-line manufacturing plant-a system of 
machinery-and the training of workers to operate this line under the guidance 
of foreign engineers. Even at this stage, a minimum degree of local engineering 
capability is required for the maintenance and repair of the plant. 
   Along with the assimilation of transferred technology, efforts will shift 
towards the production of raw materials and components. This stage usually 
requires importing more foreign technology and consequently more machinery 
systems, and necessarily attracts attention to the need for higher local 
engineering capability to improve the balance of international payments. In this 
way, the process of technology transfer-especially its assimilation and further 
development-proceeds concomitantly with the growth of local engineering 
capability. 
   Therefore, the question of how and in what industry a latecomer country 
acquires basic or primitive engineering capability, as well as the manner in 
which it upgrades itself, is crucial for late, or late late industrialization. 
   The shipbuilding industry played a key role in the process of building 
engineering capability in prewar Japan. However, when Japan tried to construct 
an automobile industry, it experienced serious difficulties, and had to postpone 
its plans until the postwar period. This was partly due to the fact that the 
engineering capability built up on the experience of shipbuilding was 
insufficient for the mass production of automobiles; but even more important 
was the fact that major Japanese engineering firms were forced to be involved in 
war production. 
   Part One of this paper briefly describes the difficulties which the modern
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young shipyards faced in Meiji Japan. Part Two traces the rise of the modern 
shipbuilding industry in the first decade of the century, and the role of the 
Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard. It then examines how the early history of the 
shipbuilding industry influenced the structure of prewar Japan's social 
capability in engineering, and identifies a hierarchical structure in this 
capability. Part Three discusses Mitsubishi's plan for automobile production in 
the 191 Os and why it was abandoned. It then goes on to consider the significance 
of this decision.
Part 1 : Early trials for modern shipbuilding technology in Japan 
   The Japanese modern shipbuilding industry established its firm base in the 
first decade of the 20th century. Some fifty years had passed since 1850s, when 
an intensive effort to introduce Western shipbuilding techniques started under 
the leadership of some strong han (feudal clans) and the Bakufu (Shognate 
government). 
   Many years had been spent on the assimilation of Western shipbuilding 
technology. In this period, a combination of the circumstances particular to this 
moment in technology and the conditions indigenous to Japan as a latecomer to 
industrialization concerted to engrave unique features on the Japanese 
engineering industry-some of which still remain. Let us start by briefly 
describing this period in two stages : before and after the Meiji Restoration.
Before the Meiji Restoration : 1850-1867 
   In the 1850s there was a boom in Western-style armaments as influential 
feudal lords scrambled to defend themselves against Western fleets. There were 
three main targets : building steam warships, casting iron cannons, and 
manufacturing muskets. This boom involved a feverish movement to mobilize 
all traditional crafts and the knowledge of Rangaku (Dutch learning) which had 
accumulated since the middle of the Edo period. 
   For instance, the lord of the Satsuma han asked a famous Ranguku scholar 
to translate a Dutch textbook on steamships. Then he gathered skilled 
craftsmen and ordered them to construct a model of a steamship based on the 
translation. After confirming that the model actually moved by steam, he 
organized two teams to construct one small steamship each. Though one team 
failed utterly, another successfully completed a steamboat with a small brass 
steam engine, and a traditional Japanese wooden hull. However, its performance 
fell far short of their expectations, while the cost was tremendous. They learned 
from this experience that Western-style shipbuilding was impossible without 
resorting to mechanical engineering, and required abundant financial resources.)
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Thus steamship building was soon abandoned and most daimyos began to buy 
them secondhand in Shanghai and Hong Kong. 
   Meanwhile the Bakufu was considering technology transfer from Holland, 
the only Western country with which Japan had kept trade relations throughout 
its period of isolation. It was only the Bakufu, as the central government of 
feudal Japan, which was capable of carrying out this task. 
   It established the Nagasaki Iron Works in 1857 with technical assistance 
from Holland. The works had a naval academy attached to it. Young samurais 
selected from influential hans studied naval engineering at the academy, and 
practiced at the works. When a Russian schooner wrecked off the Japanese 
coast, and its officers asked the Bakufu's permission to rebuild it in Japan, the 
Bakufu also organized a group to study schooner building from them. While 
both the Nagasaki Iron Works training and the study of schooner building were 
useful, the Bakufu was still not satisfied : its final aim was sea defense and the 
construction of warships which could compete with Western fleets. It began to 
construct slips in the Nagasaki Iron Works, and tried to modernize its own 
shipyard, the Ishikawajima Shipyard, with imported machinery. Further, the 
Bakufu approached France for help in transferring modern shipbuilding 
technology. Construction of a large shipyard-the Yokosuka Iron Works and its 
ancillary engineering shop, the Yokohama Iron Works-started in 1864 under 
the guidance of many French engineers and mechanics.' 
   Unfortunately this project was unfinished in 1867, when the Shogun 
returned his government to the Emperor in the revolutionary political change 
known as the Meiji Restoration. The feudal system was abolished in 1871, and 
consequently most of the enterprises of the feudal lords as well as those of the 
Bakufu were closed down, though the major ones were assumed by the new 
government. 
   How and in what respects did these feverish but incomplete movements 
under the feudal system influence Japan's subsequent industrial development? 
Historians have long disputed this problem. Some argue that these were 
noneconomic activities under the leadership of feudal lords, and consequently 
had little influence on the later development of industrial capitalism. Others 
insist that they played an important role in impressing a military character on 
subsequent Japanese industrial development. 
    However, my main concern is with the later development of Japan's 
engineering capability. Here three major contributions merit special notice : 
1. Many authors stress the role played by government enterprises in the 
   industrial development of Meiji Japan. However, except for the railways, the 
   telegraph and a few manufacturing firms, most of these enterprises were
39
NAKAOKA Tetsuro
  inherited from the Bakufu or some major han. In addition, the local engineers 
  who worked in the government enterprises after the Restoration were all 
  samurai engineers trained in these movements. In short, the pre-Meiji
  movements provided the new government with several well-equipped works 
  and a group of experienced engineers. These were very valuable to the new 
  government, which at that time was extremely poor, as we shall see below. 
2. The Bakufu enterprises functioned as a training center for mechanical 
  engineering. While the Bakufu monopolized the process of foreign tech-
  nology transfer, it faced the urgent need to strengthen Japan's defense power. 
  Therefore, as exemplified by the case of the Nagasaki Iron Works, it received 
  samurai and craftsmen selected from any han and trained them in the Works 
  as far as possible. If a han requested technical help, the Bakufu sent 
  adequately skilled craftsmen from the Works. This constituted an important 
  channel of technology diffusion. The channel was restricted to such fields as 
  shipbuilding or cannon casting, because these fields were financially 
  appropriate only to the Bakufu and a few wealthy han. Perhaps the most 
  important case was gun manufacture. Most han employed a considerable 
  number of gunsmiths for traditional matchlocks. Based on their skills, many 
  han tried to take advantage of this channel for the diffusion of technology 
  and to manufacture muskets, and in some cases, even rifles. Through such 
  efforts, some techniques of mechanical engineering spread relatively widely, 
  covering nearly all of Japan.' 
3. A remarkable result of the above process was the birth of the first generation 
  of mechanics in Japan. In Western-style armament movements, it was 
  traditional craftsmen who actually constructed furnaces, cast cannons, built 
  hulls and manufactured gunlocks. They read instructions translated from 
  Dutch books, and mobilized all their experience and skill in their efforts, 
  ultimately unsuccessful, to create the devices described. Afterwards they 
  worked in the Bakufu works, or worked under the guidance of skilled 
  mechanics sent from the Bakufu works, and gradually gained experience in 
  mechanical engineering. Whether we can really call them modern mechanics 
  or not is a moot point. Essentially they were traditional Japanese craftsmen 
  with a little actual experience in engineering. In any case, it was they who 
  provided the workforce of engineering firms after the Restoration. In this 
  sense we may call them the first generation of Japanese mechanics.
After the Restoration : from 1867 to 1885 
   After the Restoration the new government requisitioned all the shipyards 
and iron works of the Bakufu. It equalled the Bakufu in its enthusiasm to
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transplant modern engineering to Japan. It established the Kobusho (Ministry of 
Public Works) in 1870. The Nagasaki Iron Works became the Nagasaki 
Shipbuilding Department of the Kobusho.4 The government bought a shipyard 
constructed in Kobe by the Kaga han, and the Vulcan Iron Works (a shipbuilding 
firm run by an American). These two became the Hyogo Shipbuilding 
Department of the Kobusho. It also obtained the Yokosuka Iron Works, 
Yokohama Iron Works, and Ishikawajima Shipyard from the Bakufu, and put 
them under the control of the Navy. 
   The Navy did not think it economical to invest scarce capital evenly into 
three shipyards. It thus concentrated its efforts on the Yokosuka Shipyard 
(previously the Yokosuka Iron Works) which was the largest among the three, 
with two docks, three slips, and a well-equipped machine shop. The government 
found the other two unmanageable. Eventually Hirano Tomiji, who had been 
trained in naval engineering at the Nagasaki Iron Works, rented Ishikawajima 
Shipyard from the government and established the Ishikawajima Shipbuilding 
Company in 1876. Later he also took over the Yokohama Iron Works from the 
government.' 
   Meanwhile shipyards and iron works managed by Westerners were 
increasing at Yokohama, Kobe and Nagasaki. In 1870 ten such firms existed at 
Yokohama, of which six were devoted to shipbuilding. Around the same time, 
four such shipbuilding firms were confirmed in Kobe. In addition, a few 
Japanese shipyards employed Western technical advisors in order to construct 
small steamers.' With the growth of international trade between East Asia and 
Europe, demand for ship repair in East Asia increased. In response to this 
demand, shipyards and related iron works run by Westerners were growing in 
Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Singapore.' It was natural that their attention shifted 
to Japan when it opened its ports. 
   While the new government was eager to introduce foreign technology, they 
were not so open to foreign capital. Though in principle they wished to exclude 
direct foreign involvement in railways, telegraph, shipping, and shipbuilding, in 
reality it was impossible to build steamers without the help of foreigners. Such 
a situation resulted in a policy of not promoting foreign enterprises, and yet 
paying extraordinarily high salaries to foreign advisors. As a result, some of the 
early foreign shipbuilders closed their works and became the so-called oyatoi 
gaikokujin, namely foreign advisors of the Kobusho. Nevertheless, other foreign 
shipbuilders continued their businesses and some of them prospered. The most 
successful example was the Kobe Iron Works managed by C. E. Kirby, who was 
the owner of the Kirby Trading House. It was estimated that the steamers built 
in the Kobe Iron Works were technologically superior to those built in the Hyogo
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Shipbuilding Department of Kobusho. 
   Thus, five relatively well-equipped shipyards constituted the leading group 
of the modern shipbuilding industry in the early Meiji Period, namely: the 
Yokosuka Shipyard of the Navy, the Nagasaki and Hyogo Shipbuilding 
Departments of the Kobusho, the Ishikawajima Shipyard and the Kobe Iron 
Works. However, these modern shipbuilders faced harsh domestic market 
conditions. Let us concentrate, first, on the business of the latter two private 
shipyards in the early Meiji market, because the former three government-
affiliated shipyards, which could count on public expenditures, are inappropriate 
for studying the business behavior of a firm in the market. 
   During the Edo period, coastal shipping by traditional wooden sailing ships 
was well developed, and supported the Japanese economy at that time. This 
traditional coastal shipping system greatly helped the early stage of economic 
growth after the Restoration; at the same time, however, it also acted as an 
obstacle to the introduction of Western-style ships. Shipping traders were so 
accustomed to Japanese ships that they demanded exclusively traditional sailing 
ships. 
   As early as 1870, in an effort to modernize the traditional shipping industry, 
the new government promoted the use of schooners or barks as more efficient 
and consequently more economical sailing ships. The government one-sidedly 
regarded the traditional ships as backward, and the Western sailing ships as 
more advanced and efficient. Nevertheless, ship owners would not buy them 
because they were far more expensive than traditional ships (about twice the 
cost), and consequently by no means economical. Furthermore, few sailors 
could handle the Western sails. 
   Finally, the government banned the construction of large traditional ships 
after 1887. Coastal shipping traders coped with this situation by constructing 
the so-called ainoko-bune (a crossbreed ship) with Western sails and Japanese 
hull, a ship that was a schooner in appearance, but which was actually 
traditional Japanese.8 In any case, Western sailing ships, not to mention 
steamers, were economically beyond the reach of traditional shipping traders. 
   On the other hand, a few modern shipping companies with relatively large 
steamers were growing under government protection. One such representative 
was the Mitsubishi company established by Iwasaki Yataro-previously a 
samurai of the Tosa han. However, it bought its ships exclusively from abroad, 
mainly at the secondhand markets of Shanghai or Hong Kong. All these 
conditions together resulted in an extremely small domestic market for 
steamers, and consequently business difficulties for the two modern shipyards. 
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   Ishikawajima built its first steamer (34 GT, paddle propelling) as early as 
1877, but no one would buy it. Hirano invited his intimate friend, the president 
of a shipping company, to this steamer. Hirano himself steered the ship, 
demonstrating how it moved by steam and mechanical devices, and how it was 
useful as a ferryboat on rivers or small bays, and he at last successfully 
persuaded his friend to buy it. In order publicly to demonstrate that steam 
ferryboats would pay, he established a ferryboat company across the Tokyo bay. 
It was this company-that is, Hirano's own-which bought the second steamer 
made by Ishikawajima. In this way, shipbuilders had to struggle to create their 
customers before building their ships.' 
   The situation slightly favored builders of Western Japan, because the Inland 
Sea provided ideal conditions for passenger transportation by small steamers. 
Many feudal lords of Western Japan bought steamships from abroad during the 
last decade of the Edo period. After the Restoration, they used their ships for the 
transport of passengers or small cargo, mainly from their previous domain to 
Osaka. Soon ferryboats became a new business. Already in the early 1880s a 
keen price war developed between more than fifty ship owners with a hundred 
small steamers, a considerable part of which were built in Osaka and Kobe. The 
Kobe Iron Works held the leading position among these wooden steamer 
builders, and was preparing for the way to building iron steamers. 
   In 1881 C. E. Kirby grasped a good business chance. Taiko Kisen Company, 
which had steamer lines across lake Biwa, planned to construct two relatively 
large steamers with iron hulls (about 500GT). Kirby was successful in securing 
an order for them because no other builders could construct iron ships. He 
enlarged the shipyard, imported new equipment, employed six new foreign 
engineers, and completed two excellent iron ships. However, the enlarged 
capacity of his shipyard brought him a new burden, namely, that of capacity 
utilization. No other shipping companies ordered iron ships. He barely secured 
an order for the warship Yamato (1,500 ton, wooden hull with iron frames, 1,071 
Hps double-expansion engine) from the Navy; but in 1883, halfway through 
construction, the Kobe Iron Works fell into serious financial trouble, and E. C. 
Kirby committed suicide. The Navy participated in the management of the 
shipyard in order to finish construction of the Yamato, and later absorbed the 
Works as the Onohama Naval Shipyard.1° 
   This tragedy illustrates the difficulties of modern shipbuilding in a 
premature market. Whether they were private or state-affiliated, the common 
weakness of these shipyards was over capacity. In the history of Western 
engineering, the development of the steam engine preceded that of the 
steamship, and therefore engine builders preceded steamship builders. As a
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result, shipbuilders could save their equipment investment by way of 
outsourcing marine engines and other mechanical systems from already 
established machine builders. However, as a latecomer to industrialization, 
Japanese shipbuilders found no marine engine builders. Inevitably, early 
Japanese shipyards had to internalize machinery manufacturing capability, 
including casting, forging and machining in addition to hull building facilities. 
This resulted in large capital investments which were difficult to recover in a 
small market for steamers. 
   As long as Kirby had restricted himself to building small wooden steamers, 
his business had gone well : in other words, capital cost was balanced with the 
market size in Western Japan. But once he made a great leap to the iron steamer 
market, the required capital investment was far larger and the market size far 
smaller. As a result, his business stumbled on the large gap between capital cost 
and market size. 
   How, then, did Ishikawajima cope with this difficulty? The Ishikawajima 
Shipyard was situated on the mouth of the Sumida river, and was not suited to 
launching large ships. Instead, it inherited various machines and equipment 
from the Yokohama Iron Works, and was more suited for engineering work. 
Further, just around this time manufacturing firms were growing in and near 
Tokyo. The demand for manufacturing machinery was growing, but imported 
machines were extremely expensive. Hirano made every effort to secure orders 
of machinery and iron frame construction. Machinery for mining, civil 
engineering, silk reeling, and printing as well as iron bridges, boilers, and steam 
engines for factories were its main items. From 1890 to 1892, for which business 
records remain, shipbuilding and repair made up only about 20% of the 
company's shipments ; 80% was for engineering work." Perhaps this behavior 
makes sense given the market conditions in the first half of the Meiji period. 
   Though the government shipyards were free from the fear of bankruptcy, 
they too confronted the problem of small market size. Unfortunately, the new 
government was financially very weak. After the abolishment of the feudal 
system, it had to pay a huge amount of money to the samurai who had lost their 
jobs. In addition, the government was burdened by the expenses of putting 
down rebellions among discontented samurai. Therefore, except for a few 
modest ships, the government did not place orders to the three shipyards. 
Though ship repair was a rather profitable business, it was not sufficiently large 
to cover the deficits of the shipbuilding department. As a result, shipyards were 
forced to take orders related to machinery and iron constructions besides ships. 
Even the Yokosuka Shipyard accepted orders of private or public firms for such
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items as boilers, steam engines, and iron bridges, and nearly half of its shipments 
were to firms other than the Navy." 
   In addition, programs for technical upgrading did not progress so well. In 
the Nagasaki Shipbuilding Department, the construction of the Tategami 
Dockyard-which, on completion was to become the largest dockyard in the 
Orient-proceeded slowly. Perhaps the most important project of this time was 
the construction of iron steam vessels using wrought iron produced from the 
newly constructed Kamaishi Iron Manufacturing Works -a project to which the 
financially weak government made the largest investment. A British engineer 
was recruited for the project. However, this Iron Works failed utterly, and closed 
down before it could produce any wrought iron. Consequently, the British 
advisor had to return home without constructing any iron ships. 13 
   Since 1880, the government had been searching for a new policy of 
restricting government enterprises to arsenals, and selling off other enterprises 
to private entrepreneurs. The serious failure of both the Kamaishi Works and 
the iron vessel project was the final blow that pushed the government to the sale 
of all its nonmilitary enterprises, including two shipbuilding departments. The 
Kobusho was closed down in 1885, and Mitsubishi took over the Nagasaki 
Shipbuilding Department (since then called the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard). 
Kawasaki Shipbuilding took over the Hyogo Shipbuilding Department (since 
then Kawasaki Shipyard). Kawasaki was a shipbuilding company that had 
grown by building Western sailing ships and small wooden steamers. In order to 
enter into iron steamer building, Kawasaki successfully competed with 
Ishikawajima to acquire the Hyogo Department. 
   Efforts to transfer modern shipbuilding technology after the Restoration 
were not so successful either. One could say that Japan was not prepared in any 
way for the introduction of modern shipbuilding technology until around the 
mid-1880s. Western shipbuilding technology at that time was changing rapidly, 
from wooden to iron and then to steel hulls, and from single to triple expansion 
engines. Large cruisers of 5,000-10,000 GT were becoming popular. Market 
conditions, undeveloped engineering industries, infant higher technical 
education systems, and poor financial resources, made it difficult for Japan to 
keep up with this rapid technological change. Even a company managed by a 
British entrepreneur failed in a venture to make the leap to iron steamers. 
   A private shipbuilder, i.e., Ishikawajima, survived this difficult situation. At 
the end of this period the government sold off its two shipyards, and these 
became the basis for two new private shipbuilding companies, namely, the 
Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard and the Kawasaki Shipyard. These three were
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perhaps the leading private shipbuilders in this period. In the middle of the 
1880s, however, their technological position was far behind that of Western 
shipbuilders. Take, for example, the year when each first completed an iron 
ship : Ishikawajima completed a gun boat (627 ton) in 1888, Mitsubishi a coal 
transporting boat (200 ton) in 1887, and Kawasaki a merchant vessel (200 GT) in 
1886.14 
   The difficulties of these early years impressed upon the three shipyards an 
important characteristic : they internalized a general engineering capability that 
allowed them to cover a wide range of machinery and iron frame constructions. 
These shipyards were actually companies that manufactured to order all sorts of 
large machines and machine systems, including iron steamers. 
   While the technology of advanced countries progressed towards large steel 
vessels with triple expansion engines, small wooden steamers gradually diffused 
into the Japanese ship market, mainly as ferryboats for Tokyo Bay, the Inland 
Sea, Lake Biwa, and some large rivers. In response to this diffusion, smaller 
shipbuilders sprang up around Yokohama, Osaka and Kobe. These small 
shipbuilders shared the same character as large shipyards mentioned above, and 
responded to orders from various machinery, including small steam ships. 
   It is important to note that workshops of this period, especially the arsenals, 
large shipyards, and works of foreigners, played the role of technical training 
centers. As a result of the armament movement of the 1850s, mechanics of the 
first generation dispersed widely, moving even into regions far away from 
Tokyo or Osaka. If they felt a need for additional engineering techniques, they 
went to Tokyo, Yokohama or Osaka to work for a while at, for instance, a 
Kobusho factory or a shipyard managed by a foreigner and then returned to 
their regions. In some cases, skilled mechanics from arsenals or five major 
shipyards came to the region, and established iron works. In this way, 
mechanical engineering diffused to local regions far away from Tokyo or Osaka. 
   According to Suzuki Jun's survey, machinery suppliers to the coal mines of 
northern Kyushu in this time were classified hierarchically into three. 15 At the 
top, the Nagasaki Shipbuilding Department and other Kobusho enterprises 
supplied relatively high performance machinery, which were more expensive 
than imported ones. In the middle, machine builders including small 
shipbuilders at Kobe and Osaka, provided simpler but efficient machinery at 
reasonable prices. And at the bottom, the cheapest but inferior performance 
machines were supplied by mechanics of the first generation in local regions. 
This hierarchical structure characterized the social distribution of mechanical 
skills which supported the economic growth of the following decades.
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Part 2 : The rise of the modern shipbuilding industry. 
Changes in the ship market with the economic growth 
   Economists regard 1886 as the starting point of Japan's modern economic 
growth. A sustained economic growth started from this year. The growth was 
supported by a mixture of different categories of industrial development : a) the 
development of the modern cotton spinning and half-modernized silk reeling 
industries, which became the pillar of Japan's exports until the mid-1930s; b) 
weaving and other traditional consumer goods industries, which mainly drew on 
traditional handicraft techniques ; c) export-oriented soap, matches, rugs, mats, 
and other manufactures which were exported to the Asian and American 
markets ; d) copper and coal mines in which Japan was naturally rich ; e) 
railways, the aggregate length of which stretched 123 km in 1880, 2,251 in 1890, 
6,480 in 1900 and 9,980 in 1910, the share of private railways being about 80%. 
   This economic growth radically changed the environment for shipbuilding. 
Japan's international trade developed remarkably, and business opportunities of 
shipping and ship repair increased in parallel. People became gradually aware of 
a large gap between the abundance of business opportunities, and the country's 
weakness in shipping and shipbuilding." 
   In 1884, fifty-five small shipping traders in the Inland Sea in association 
with the leadership of the Sumitomo family-a large copper mine owner in West 
Japan-formed the 0. S. K. Lines, Ltd.. This move was a defensive measure to 
avert serious price competition in the midst of a long and steep recession; but it 
actually worked to prepare the modernization of Inland Sea shipping, and to 
create a large shipping company. In the next year, the largest shipping company, 
Mitsubishi, merged with its competitor Kyodo Shipping Co., to form the Nippon 
Mail Ship Co.. This move, too, was a defensive effort to escape from the price 
competition between the two, but it also paved the way for the subsequent rapid 
growth of Japan's international trade. The birth of these influential customers of 
large merchant vessels had important consequences for later developments. 
   Perhaps it was the Mitsubishi company which profited most from this 
market change. When it merged with Kyodo Shipping, the company was 
already a large conglomerate operating many coal, gold, silver, and copper 
mines, a large shipyard (borrowed from the government), a bank, and a few 
agricultural farms ; it also had at the same time the largest shipping department. 
After separating the shipping department for the new company-Nippon Mail 
Ship-it reorganized the remaining part as a limited partnership, and started 
anew in 1886. In 1887 Mitsubishi officially bought the Nagasaki Shipyard from 
the government and launched into an ambitious project to develop it into a large
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modernized shipyard which could compete with its British counterpart. 
   The company already owned Mitsubishi Iron Works since 1875, which was 
actually a ship repair shop that had accumulated experience in ship repair under 
the guidance of British technical and managerial advisors. The equipment from 
the Works, along with four foreign advisors, a few Japanese staff and skilled 
mechanics were transferred to Nagasaki. While most of the engineering staff of 
the Kobusho Shipbuilding Department had left the Shipyard, two of them 
remained. 17 In addition, an experienced British engineer was recruited as the 
manager in charge of the engineering works. Notwithstanding these efforts, the 
overall workforce of the new shipyard lacked shipbuilding experience. The 
company history states : 
   When the Mitsubishi company assumed the shipyard there was a 
   remarkable lack of staff experienced in shipbuilding. This was the reason 
   why we were so enthusiastic to recruit young engineering personnel.18
   The department of shipbuilding of the Kobu Daigakko (Imperial Engineer-
ing College) had been producing young engineers every year since 1880. After 
the abolishment of the Kobusho, it became the shipbuilding department of the 
Engineering School of the Imperial University and continued to produce 
shipbuilding engineers. From 1890 to 1897, Mitsubishi Nagasaki recruited two 
graduates from the Imperial Engineering College, five from the Imperial 
University, one from Glasgow University, and twelve from the Tokyo Technical 
College and other technical colleges. This reflects their intensive recruitment of 
engineers. These engineers actually supported technically the development of 
the Shipyard since 1896.19 
   These young hires also lacked experience in actual shipbuilding. It was O. 
S. K. Lines which gave them their first experience of building a steel vessel with 
a triple expansion engine. When 0. S. K. started in 1884, it ordered four iron 
steamers with double expansion engines from the government shipyards. The 
first ship was constructed at the Onohama Naval Shipyard (previously Kobe Iron 
Works). The construction of the second, third, and fourth was carried on at 
Hyogo Shipbuilding Department of the Kobusho, which was taken over by the 
Kawasaki Shipbuilding Company halfway. Consequently, the Kawasaki 
Shipyard completed these three iron ships. Perhaps their good performance 
convinced O. S. K. that private shipbuilders were competent to build a steel 
merchant vessel of 500 GT class. 
   When it planned the modernization of its coastal lines by introducing steel 
merchant vessels of 500-600 GT, O. S. K. provided three companies an equal 
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opportunity to build them-Kawasaki, Mitsubishi Nagasaki, and Osaka Iron 
Works. The last one was a shipbuilding company established in 1881 by E. H. 
Hunter, who had previously been an employee of the Kirby Trading House. 
Technically, it was ranked next to the Kobe Iron Works among shipyards run by 
foreigners. Though its location in Osaka was not appropriate for the 
construction of large vessels, O. S. K. Lines gave it priority with regard to 
relatively small vessels, since all O. S. K. lines started from Osaka. 
   On this occasion Mitsubishi Nagasaki built three steel vessels of 600 GT 
class. For the young engineers who had been recruited, this was not only their 
first experience of actual shipbuilding, but also the first step in their attempt to 
master the latest shipbuilding technology. In order to supplement their lack of 
experience in making iron or steel hulls, a foreman was recruited from the 
Onohama Naval Shipyard. He brought with him some mechanics skilled in iron 
hull building, and the abundant knowhow that he had gained when the Kobe 
Iron Works constructed two iron steamers in 1881.20 In other words, he was 
responsible for transferring the iron hull technology of the Kobe Iron Works to 
Mitsubishi Nagasaki. 
   The guidance of foreign advisors was even more important. Around this 
time the shipyards recruited three technical advisors from Glasgow, who were 
made responsible for drawing, mechanical engineering, and casting respective-
ly." This suggests a situation in which the shipyards still very much required 
the guidance of foreign advisors for the assimilation of latest technology. 
However, the earlier advisors from Mitsubishi Iron Works were up to this task. 
   Meanwhile, growing international trade provided shipbuilders with 
increasing opportunities to repair large steel ships. The repair and maintenance 
of large steel ships had two implications for the rise of the modern shipbuilding 
industry. First, young engineers were trained and prepared for the construction 
of larger ships through this experience. Second, ship repairing was a good 
business for shipyards. For the first time since the Restoration, major shipyards 
enjoyed good business, and accumulated enough capital to modernize their 
yards. Here, Mitsubishi Nagasaki had an advantage, because of its strong 
connections with Nippon Mail Ship, the largest owner of large vessels in Japan; 
at the same time, it owned the largest dockyard in Japan, the Tategami Dock. 
   Helped by these conditions, Mitsubishi Nagasaki succeeded in constructing 
a larger steel vessel Suma-maru (1,592 GT) in 1895. Young Japanese engineers 
took the initiative to implement this project and carry it out. This was an 




The challenge of Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard 
   The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 made the government aware of the 
country's weakness in transoceanic shipping. During the war the government 
had had urgently to import many large steel vessels, and this taught it that 
Japan lacked shipbuilding capability too. In 1896, it implemented two maritime 
laws to promote shipping and shipbuilding. The former provided subsidies to 
shipping companies which set up lines across the ocean, and the latter to 
shipbuilders who built steel or iron ships larger than 700 GT. 
   Both Nippon Mail Ship and Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard reacted promptly 
to these laws. The former planned to buy 12 new vessels of 6,100-6,300 GT with 
the subsidies that the law provided, and the latter made every effort to secure a 
few of the orders. Eventually Nippon Mail Ship decided to order two vessels23 
from Mitsubishi. It was a true venture for both sides. It was widely believed that 
Mitsubishi would fail to respond successfully to this order. However Mitsubishi 
succeeded in launching two large vessels which showed excellent performance 
in serving Nippon Mail Ship's line to Europe. 
   Witnessing this success, O. S. K. Lines began to order relatively large vessels 
from Kawasaki and Osaka Iron Works to take advantage of the shipping law. A 
few developing shipping companies followed. 
   During the first decade of the century, 89 vessels were launched with the 
subsidies provided by the shipbuilding law. 21 were vessels over 5,000 GT, of 
which 16 were built at Mitsubishi, and 5 at Kawasaki. All these large vessels 
were ordered by Nippon Mail Ship, O. S. K. Lines, and a newly emerging shipping 
company Toyo Steamers (Toyo Kisen). Ishikawajima built only two relatively 
small ships (1,600 GT and 917 GT) mainly because it did not have close relations 
with either Nippon Mail Ship or O. S. K. Lines, and consequently could not secure 
their orders. We can say that the Japanese modern shipbuilding industry stood 
on its own feet at last towards the end of the third phase. However at the same 
time a clearly ranked order was established among early shipbuilders, as shown 
in Table 1. Mitsubishi's leading position is striking. 
   Let us analyze the above process from the viewpoint of engineering
Table 1 Ships built between 1898 and 1912 with subsidization by the Shipbuilding Law
Gross Tonnage of Ships over 10,000 3,000 - 9,999 1,000 - 2,999 700-999
Mitsubishi 3 20 19 1
Kawasaki 10 16 5





From shipbuilding to automobile manufacturing
capability building. 
   Two main targets of technical efforts in this process were : i) the building of 
even larger steel hulls, and ii) the construction of even larger triple expansion 
marine engines. The latter target appears to have been achieved with relatively 
less difficulty by all four shipyards, including Ishikawajima. Boilers and steam 
engines were the most important items for their business during the hard period 
when they were forced to do various engineering work other than shipbuilding. 
Since the beginning of the Meiji period, they had had much experience in 
constructing boilers and engines for mines, factories, power stations, and ships, 
and thus had developed the capability to produce boilers that could generate 
high pressure steam and power triple expansion engines. This suggests the 
importance of experience in the building of engineering capability. In fact the 
experience of manufacturing an engine is the best learning process for acquiring 
engine technology and, at the same time, the most secure step for manufacturing 
a larger engine This was, of course, the same for the first target, namely, even 
larger steel hulls. Here the difficulty that Japanese shipyards faced was the 
shipowners' preference for buying their ships from abroad. They did not have 
confidence in local shipyards because they lacked experience in constructing 
large ships. And yet, local shipyards could never gain experience in building 
large steel hulls unless they received orders for large ships-a vicious cycle 
intrinsic to the manufacturing industry of latecomers. 
   And so an important question here is : who dared to provide Mitsubishi 
Nagasaki with the opportunity to construct larger hulls? 
   The first opportunity to construct 500-600 GT hulls was given by 0. S. K. to 
three shipyards. 0. S. K. required high performance ships of this class in order to 
get ahead of competitors in the Inland Sea. However it was very difficult to find 
such ships in the secondhand market in Shanghai or Hong Kong; the ships that 
plied the waters between Europe and East Asia were considerably larger. Thus 
0. S. K. had to order these ships from competent local shipbuilders. Next, 
Mitsubishi Nagasaki took the lead over the other two by constructing a hull of 
1,592 GT. This was a gamble for the Mitsubishi company. At first Mitsubishi 
planned to sell the ship to 0. S. K., but the latter was reluctant to buy it. 
Construction began without an order from an outside customer. The Mitsubishi 
company was supposed to use it for the transportation of coal from its mines if 
the completed ship could find no customer. The ship was completed in 1895 in 
the midst of Sino-Japanese War. The army hired it immediately for the 
transportation of munitions. After the war it was bought by 0. S. K..24 The inner 




   Mitsubishi Nagasaki then extended its lead over the other two by 
constructing two 6,000 GT hulls. This opportunity was provided by Nippon 
Mail Ship, a shipping company which originated from Mitsubishi. Though it 
was a risky venture to order such large ships from a local shipyard, upgrading 
the ship building and repair capabilities of Mitsubishi Nagasaki was to the 
advantage of Nippon Mail Ship, which was developing rapidly. It dared to run 
a risk in order to gain this advantage. 
   This last situation was the same with O. S. K. Lines. As the second largest 
shipping company, it also found it advantageous to develop close ties with some 
adequate shipyards. It chose Osaka Iron Works as a candidate, but un-
fortunately its location was not appropriate to the building of large vessels. 
After the Sino-Japanese War, O. S. K. began to develop lines between East Asia 
and Japan, and ordered larger vessels from Kawasaki, leaving the smaller vessels 
for the Inland Sea lines to Osaka Iron Works. However, O. S. K. had no need of 
large vessels over 5,000 GT until 1910, when it opened a line across the Pacific 
Ocean to North and South America. This deprived Kawasaki of the opportunity 
to construct a larger steel hull, and was the cause for its technical lag behind 
Mitsubishi Nagasaki. In this way a hierarchy developed among Mitsubishi, 
Kawasaki, and Osaka Iron Works. 
   The situation was much harder for the shipyards in Tokyo and Yokohama, 
including the Ishikawajima Shipyard. They lacked the close relations with the 
two shipping companies, and the two for their part were not so large as to place 
orders over the capacities of Mitsubishi Nagasaki, Kawasaki, and Osaka Iron 
Works. Other ship owners were still largely inclined to buy secondhand vessels 
from abroad. When the two maritime laws were enacted, a few shipbuilders 
including Ishikawajima constructed large new shipyards expecting an increased 
demand for shipbuilding and repairing, but on the contrary they fell into the 
worst price competition possible in a narrow market. Ishikawajima had to sell 
its new shipyard to its competitor, Uraga Dockyard. Nevertheless, it survived 
this hard situation by shifting its business activities toward general engineering 
work. 
   Among the three successful shipbuilders, Osaka Iron Works developed into 
a builder that mostly specialized into ships, while Mitsubishi and Kawasaki took 
advantage of their success and developed into general engineering companies. 
Ishikawajima survived as the third important company oriented to general 
engineering. 
   The period we are concerned in this section was characterized by the start of 
modern economic growth-a growth which was necessarily accompanied by
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surging demand for various capital goods. Who supplied these capital goods? 
The answer to this question will clarify the structure of the engineering 
capability that Japan had accumulated until this time. As we noted earlier, 
modern economic growth was sustained by roughly five different trends in 
industrial development. 
   The first trend : the development of the modern cotton spinning industry 
depended exclusively on equipment imported from the West, mostly from 
Britain; by contrast, the silk reeling industry grew depending almost solely on 
locally manufactured equipment-a phenomenon which I have previously 
termed "hybrid technology".25 Traditional carpenters, craftsmen and mechanics 
who had come from earlier shipyards and other factories collaborated in its 
manufacture. Some firms, after having developed into larger companies, began 
to buy more sophisticated boilers and reeling equipment from local engineering 
firms such as Ishikawajima. 
   The second trend : the growth of textile and other traditional consumer goods 
sector started soon after the opening of ports and accelerated with the 
abolishment of the feudal system. Capital goods were naturally traditional ones, 
manufactured by traditional craftsmen, but they were gradually influenced by 
imported machinery; various mechanisms borrowed from abroad were adapted 
to traditional tools. For instance, in the 1890s, some carpenters adapted the 
power drive mechanism to the traditional treadle loom, and developed a wooden 
power loom for kimono cloths. This was an important innovation which 
contributed greatly to the development of the weaving industries. 
   The third trend : products supporting this trend can be divided into two 
categories, namely, products of Western origin, such as soap and matches, and 
traditional Japanese products, such as rugs and mats. The former products were 
exported to the Asian market as cheap, but inferior goods, and the latter to the 
American market as oriental curiosities. The latter were manufactured mainly 
by handwork, and necessarily required no meaningful capital goods. The former 
also were produced in a labor-intensive way using very primitive tools. For 
instance, in the early stage of soap manufacture, the saponification process was 
carried out in a large iron pot heated on a traditional Japanese cooking stove. It 
was in the first decade of the century that a simple chemical reactor began to 
prevail in this process. The reactor constituted of an iron tank, a stirrer, and a 
steam pipe heater, and could be produced by a small iron works run by a 
mechanic trained in small shipbuilders or factories." 
   The fourth trend : the development of mining industries was specifically 
important to latecomer Japan. Mines were good customers of local engineering 
firms in the earlier phases. Large boilers, steam engines, and machines such as
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crushers and winches were appropriate items for early large shipbuilders and 
engineering firms. Smaller and simpler items such as pumps, trucks, and small 
boilers were appropriate for small shipbuilders or small iron works run by local 
mechanics. However, along with economic growth major mines began to 
rationalize their mining process, and adopted the latest Western technology, for 
instance, high pressure steam engines, electric motors and machinery, and power 
stations. All such machinery and plants were imported. 
   The fifth trend : the development of railways depended largely on the import 
of both rolling stock and rails. Import substitution of carriages and freight cars 
began relatively early, but the local manufacture of locomotives was rare until 
the end of the Meiji period. We might as well include the development of the 
shipping industry in this trend. Here the early growth of large shipping 
companies depended exclusively on imported vessels. In contrast, well-
developed coastal shipping continued to rely solely on traditional Japanese 
sailing ships. With the start of modern economic growth a new type of shipping 
company emerged. O. S. K. Lines, for instance, started with relatively small iron 
and steel vessels built by local shipyards, and in the following decade the three 
shipbuilders established their business foundations through the process 
described above. In spite of this, a majority of ship owners continued to believe 
that it was most profitable for them to buy secondhand vessels from abroad. 
This situation did not change radically until World War I. 
   The above survey can be schematically summarized (Fig. 1). Japanese 
historians have long insisted that Japan's Industrial Revolution took place 
around the 1890s, and that it was a development in which no capital goods were 
made in Japan. In other words, the development depended exclusively on 
imported capital goods. However, Fig. 1 gives us a very different picture. It is 
true that the relatively narrow top section represented by the development of 
large companies in the spinning, mining, shipping, railways and other industries 
depended largely on imported capital goods. However, even in this level, large 
capital goods produced by local engineering firms, including shipbuilders, had 
started partly to substitute for imported capital goods. 
   The firms in the middle section of the hierarchy depended mainly on locally 
manufactured capital goods. And various developments at the bottom section 
depended on traditional capital goods and simple machines. Of course, all these 
were manufactured locally. 
   It may be useful for later analyses to consider the economic nature of this 
hierarchy. In general, capital is a scarce resource in a developing country, and 
foreign currency is usually scarce. Therefore, a capital-intensive course of
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Capital Goods Supply
       Arsenals 
    Major Mines 
   Relatively Large 
  Firms of Shipping, 
  Railways, Shipbuilding, 
 Electrical Engineering etc. 
The Cotton Spinning Industry
Mainly imported from abroad. 
Partly supplied by local. large 
shipyards or a few engineering 
firms.
    Small and Medium Size Mines \ 
    Medium Size Firms Grown up 
    from the Bottom Section 
The Half-mechanized Silk Reeling Industry
Partly imported from abroad. 
Mainly supplied by local 
manufacturers.
        Majority of Coastal Shipping Firms 
         Export-oriented Small Industries
     Small Household Concerns for Weaving Works 
Traditional Consumer Goods Industries including Food Processing
Mainly improved 
traditional capital goods. 
Partly simple machines 
made by mechanics.
 Fig. 1 The hierarchical structure of Japanese industry and suppliers of capital goods to it. 
        (Around the turn of the century) 
industrialization based upon imported equipment is in principle impossible to 
follow. This held true for Japan in the Meiji period. A closer look at these 
developments reveals that an adequate combination of capital-intensive and 
labor-intensive development-or of a development depending intensively on 
imported machinery and one depending solely on locally manufactured ones-
represented the secret of rapid industrial development of this time. 
   Take the cotton industry as an example. The spinning sector of the industry 
developed depending exclusively on full lines of the latest plants imported from 
Britain. As a result, spinning frames occupied the top share in Japan's import of 
machinery for a while. Many large and modern enterprises grew in this sector. 
In contrast, the weaving sector of the industry developed largely around small 
household works, which were organized by the "putting out system". Expansion 
of the domestic market and the improvement of the wooden loom and other 
traditional weaving techniques were what pulled development of this sector.
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There is thus an impressive contrast between the large-scale and mechanized 
production of the spinning sector and small-scale and handicraft-like 
production of the weaving sector. Some authors characterize the latter as a 
remnant of the feudal production system and a symbol of Japan's backward-
ness.27 However, the cotton industry as a whole, which combined the two 
sectors, worked as an economic textile production system that was relatively 
capital saving. It partly adopted advanced technology, partly took advantage of 
the abundant labor that was mechanically unskilled; this was a combination 
which was eminently appropriate to latecomer Japan. 
   The combination of the silk reeling industry and the railways offers another 
similar example. The development of railways depended heavily on the import 
of locomotives, rolling stocks, and rails, and consequently was accompanied by 
an increase in imports. However, railways promoted the growth of the silk 
reeling industry, the most important export industry in Meiji Japan . The first 
successful private railway, the Nippon Railway, connected Tokyo and Aomori 
through northeast Japan where sericulture had developed. The construction of 
the Nippon Railway remarkably decreased the transportation costs of silk yarn 
from regions along the line to the port of Yokohama , and contributed 
enormously to the development of the silk reeling industry-exclusively 
dependent on locally manufactured capital goods-in these regions. And the 
intensive import of capital goods by the railways was paid for by foreign 
currency which the silk reeling industry earned through the export of silk. 
Technologically, then, Japanese industry at that time was not homogeneous. 
Heterogeneous sectors or heterogeneous industries complemented each other 
and constituted a relatively efficient overall economic system. 
   We find this economic structure reflected in the engineering industry of the 
time. It was a heterogeneous mixture of works ranging from large firms , with 
modern engineering, to craftsmen's ateliers not so different from that of the Edo 
period. Table 2 shows the distribution of firms in the Japanese machinery sector 
in 1911. The concentration of major firms in the shipbuilding subsector is 
remarkable. Five firms were listed with more than a thousand employees. They 
were Mitsubishi Nagasaki, Kawasaki, Uraga Dockyard, Osaka Iron Works, and 
Mitsubishi Kobe. However, even more impressive is the concentration of small 
firms in every subsector. These firms had different origins, and consequently 
were of a different nature than the major firms. Comparing Table 2 with Fig. 1, 
we can discern a hierarchical structure divided into three sections. 
   At the upper section, major shipbuilders and a few relatively large 
engineering firms were manufacturing machinery that could barely compete
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5- 9 67 70 27 14 176 50 4 92 500
10 - 29 76 36 26 11 96 32 6 12 295
30 - 49 23 6 6 6 10 8 1 1 61
50 - 99 11 2 4 3 13 9 5 2 49
100 - 199 1 4 3 1 2 1 4 1 17
200 - 499 4 1 3 1 7 5 21
500 - 999 1 3 4
1,000 - 1,999 3 3
2,000 - 4,999 1 1
5,000 - 1 1
Total 182 118 67 39 298 115 25 108 952
Source : Meiji 44-nen Kojo tsuran (List of factories in 1911) 
The table was cited from the author's The learning process and the market : the Japanese capital goods sector in 
the early twentieth century STICERD, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1994.
with imported ones either in quality or in price. The following list summarizes 
the engineering work of Ishikawajima in 1910s. It gives us a sense of the 
engineering capability of firms in the upper section." 
  • Electrical machinery : generators , boiler and steam engines for generators, 
   switchboards mainly for small power stations. 
  • Cranes : for shipyards , iron works, steel makers and civil engineering work. 
  • Rolling stocks : freight cars , steam or electric locomotives for narrow gauges, 
   signal mechanisms, for mines and private railways. 
  • Iron frame constructions : bridges and buildings for national as well as 
   private railways, stations, and factories. 
  • Miscellaneous : silk reeling equipment , gas tanks, iron pipes for water 
   supply, various sorts of pumps. 
   From these items we can see how a wide range of demand for local 
engineering work was generated by growing industries and the related 
development of infrastructure, and the degree to which the engineering 
capability of the top firms was able to meet them. 
   In the middle section of the hierarchy were many medium-size firms with 
employees ranging from 50-300, which manufactured a wide range of industrial 
machinery in response to the increasing demand for capital goods from smaller 
mines, textile industries, small manufacturers, and local railways. While 
mechanization was beginning to spread into every area of the development in 
this period, machines or machine systems made by major firms, and of course 
those imported from abroad, were beyond the reach of most manufacturers and 
entrepreneurs. Consequently, there emerged a great demand for locally
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manufactured and cheaper machines. Demand for such machinery as oil and gas 
engines for small firms and fishing boats, mining machines for small mines, 
rolling stock for local railways, and narrow width power looms for kimono 
weavers, was especially strong. Medium-size engineering firms more or less 
specialized in building one of these items. They had different origins. For 
instance, the machine shop of a large mine or a railway company separated from 
the parent company to become a specialized builder of mining machines or 
rolling stock; mechanics from a machine shop of the early years grew into an oil 
engine manufacturer; the workshop of a hybrid machine inventor grew into a 
loom works. Toyoda Loom Works, established by an inventor of narrow-width 
power looms, and which later became Toyota Motor, is an example of the last 
case.29 
   At the bottom, a large number of small firms manufactured various 
machines or various components of machinery. As official statistics of this time 
   Table 3 Classified list of products by small firms and number of firms producing them
Prime mover and related machinery : 205 Oil and gas engines 92
Steam boilers 59
Steam engines 48
Electric motors and generators 6
Transport equipment : 213 Small ships and repair 101
Various carts 75
Bicycles and repair 37
Machinery related to urban lives: 153 Pumps 47
Metal products for building 18
Printing and related machinery 26
Electricity, gas and water supply related 32
Food processing machinery 30
Machinery invented locally : 108 Narrow looms and others 48
Rickshaws 13
Noodle manufacturing machines 7
Rice milling equipment 45
Machinery for the primary sector: 56 Mining machinery 22
Sawmill machinery 10
Cotton beating machines 11
Agricultural machinery 13
Textile machinery : 55 Machinery related to cotton spinning 22
Devices for silk reeling 14
Devices for weaving 8
Sewing machine and repair 7
Machinery related to dyeing 4
Machinery for export-oriented labor-intensive
industries (match, knitwear, braid, etc.) : 15
Machine-tool : 18
Various machines : 130
Repair to machines : 61
Machinery parts : 26
Source : Meiji 44 -nen Kojo Tsuran.
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omitted firms with less than five employees, we may suppose that far more 
smaller firms existed than are listed. Table 3 shows a rough picture of the items 
that they manufactured. 
Part 3 : Towards the age of automobiles 
The impact of World War I 
   The outbreak of the World War I cut off imports from the West, and thus 
dealt a serious blow to Japanese industry. Construction work on all large power 
stations and high voltage transmission lines stopped because imported 
equipment became unavailable. The growing shipbuilding industry suffered 
from a shortage of steel plates, and a large increase in prices. Many other 
industries suffered similar shortages of chemicals, machine tools, and other 
imported materials and machinery. 
   However, this chaotic situation provided capable engineering firms with a 
marvelous opportunity for import substituting production. Top-rank firms 
could thus construct high voltage electrical equipment, middle-rank firms could 
supply machine tools, and innovative entrepreneurs could make steel with open 
hearths. 
   Moreover, some countries belonging to the allied force required the help of 
Japanese manufacturers to produce munitions. Russia ordered a large amount of 
machinery from a few middle-rank firms to make shells and light arms. Facing 
a shortage of cargo building capacity, the United States arrived at an agreement 
with the Japanese shipbuilders that the U. S. government would provide steel 
plates to the builders who sold them cargo at a favorable rate on its tonnage. 
The agreement profited not only the three already established builders, but also 
others which previously had been excluded from the large vessel market. 
Ishikawajima took advantage of this situation to make its entry into large vessel 
building. 
   Thus World War I provided Japanese engineering firms with a great chance 
to improve their business position. 
Towards a conglomerate of engineering industries 
   Of course, the situation offered the greatest opportunities to the top two 
firms, namely Mitsubishi and Kawasaki. Already in the decade preceding the 
war they were preparing to make an entry into machine building fields other 
than ships. Mitsubishi started research on steam turbines and internal 
combustion engines including diesel engines. Though Mitsubishi succeeded in 
constructing its first merchant vessel over 10,000 GT propelled by a steam 
turbine, its final target was perhaps the application of turbines to electric 
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generators; that is, Mitsubishi targetted the capital goods sector of the newly 
emerging electric power distribution industry. Similarly the goal of the internal 
combustion engine division was to apply this technology to all sorts of new 
transportation machinery such as submarines, aircraft, and automobiles. 
Mitsubishi invested much into the internal combustion engine and electrical 
machinery divisions of its Kobe Shipyard. These two divisions were soon 
separated from Kobe Shipyard to become the Mitsubishi Internal Combustion 
Engine Co. (1920) and the Mitsubishi Electrical Engineering Co. (1921). 
   In a similar manner, in the first decade of the century Kawasaki began to 
manufacture locomotives and other rolling stocks. After the Russo-Japanese 
war, the government requisitioned main private railways and, together with the 
governmental lines, created the National Railways network, which covered the 
main islands of Japan. Then it launched on the project of the localization of its 
standard locomotives. Kawasaki played an important role in this project as the 
leading manufacturer, and became the largest locomotive maker. During the 
war, it established a steelmaking division to cope with the shortage of steel, as 
well as a shipping company in order to provide an inner market for its 
shipbuilding department. Thus Kawasaki followed the path of a conglomerate, 
though it was smaller in scale than Mitsubishi.
Towards automobile manufacturing 
   At this time, perhaps one of the most important targets for the two was the 
automobile industry. And in fact Mitsubishi started trial manufacture of 
passenger cars as early as 1917 in the internal combustion engine division of 
Kobe Shipyard. Nevertheless, neither Mitsubishi nor Kawasaki proceeded to the 
large-scale production of automobiles. Why they didn't is an interesting 
problem of prewar Japan's industrial development. 
   The start of the trial manufacture of automobile was directed by the main 
office of Mitsubishi company." This fact testifies to the fact that automobile 
manufacture was actually one of strategic targets of Mitsubishi in this period. A 
passenger car imported from Fiat was broken up and every part was sketched 
and investigated in detail. Afterwards the manufacture of a dead copy was tried 
out. The innumerable difficulties that were recorded give us the impression that 
the tools and mechanical engineering techniques used in shipbuilding were too 
large and rough for manufacturing passenger cars.31 In the event, Mitsubishi 
completed five test cars and began to plan a third shipyard having the capacity 
to manufacture several submarines, 300 cars, 360 aircraft engines, and a few 
stationary diesel engines. 
   Meanwhile, the Army implemented a law to subsidize military vehicles, and
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invited many competent firms, including Mitsubishi Kobe, Kawasaki, Osaka Iron 
Works and Ishikawajima, to enter into the production of military trucks. 
Ishikawajima accepted the Army's offer. It had been preparing since 1916 to 
manufacture automobiles and signed a contract in 1918 with a British car 
manufacturer Wolseley, to purchase the design of two passenger cars and and a 
truck with technical aid. However, the sale of Wolseley cars in the domestic 
market was not very successful, so Ishikawajima decided to enter into the 
production of military trucks, which were subsidized by the Army." Other 
shipyards did not accept the Army's offer; neither did Mitsubishi, notwith-
standing its careful preparations for automobile manufacture. 
   It is supposed that Mitsubishi had carried out comparative production tests 
between aircraft and automobiles, and decided to focus on aircraft production 
for the navy. Since the beginning of the century, Mitsubishi had been 
developing close relations with the navy by gradually increasing the share of 
warships in ships built in Nagasaki Shipyard. When the plan of the Nagoya 
Shipyard was realized, it was actually an aircraft manufacturing plant for the 
Navy, and the equipment from the supposed automobile shop was transferred to 
its small works at Tokyo, which subsequently developed into a tank 
manufacturing plant in the 1930s. 
   Mitsubishi's course represented the fate of major engineering firms in the 
interwar period. They involved themselves deeper and deeper in the production 
of munitions. The Kawasaki group also gradually increased the weight of 
warships, aircraft and tanks.33 Ishikawajima continued the production of 
military trucks, and soon separated its automobile division as Ishikawajima 
Automobile Co., which merged with other two manufacturers to form Tokyo 
Automobile Manufacturing. This company continued to produce heavy military 
trucks and later tanks under the protection of the army. Meanwhile the 
Japanese car market was dominated by Ford and GM. 
Concluding remarks 
   We have surveyed the development of Japan's engineering capability since 
the mid-19t'' century to the interwar period. 
   The development of Japan's social capability for engineering was closely 
related to that of the shipbuilding industry. As early as the 1850s the Bakufu 
started its effort to transfer Western shipbuilding technology into Japan. The 
Meiji government followed up on the Bakufu's effort and tried to modernize the 
local shipping industry by making steamers as soon as possible. But as a 
latecomer to industrialization, Japan found this impossible to achieve. 
   The difficulties faced by early modern shipyards can be summarized as 
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follows. Imported machinery was very expensive. Furthermore, because no 
engineering industries actually existed in Japan, they had to incorporate the 
capacity to manufacture machines which their Western counterparts could 
easily obtain by outsourcing. At the same time, the Japanese shipping industry 
needed few steamers. Sailors did not know how to steer these, nor did ship 
owners know how to apply these to their business. They preferred traditional 
sailing ships to steamers. As a result, all these shipyards suffered from a large 
gap between the relatively large capacities of their expensive plants and the 
small market for their products. 
   While the Japanese shipbuilding struggled with these difficulties, Western 
shipbuilding technology rapidly changed towards large cruisers with steel hulls 
and triple expansion marine engines. Notwithstanding the former's intensive 
efforts, the technological gap between Japan and the West was widening. 
   However, from 1890 to 1911, Japanese shipbuilders made a great techni-
cal leap and almost caught up with their Western counterparts. Mitsubishi 
Nagasaki Shipyards led this process. In this respect Mitsubishi's case deserves 
closer consideration. 
   The tragedy of Kobe Iron Works shows eloquently that this type of 
technical leap in the early difficult conditions was quite risky. On the one hand, 
such a leap required a huge investment in equipment and engineering staff, and 
on the other it was difficult to find customers for a newly manufactured 
products. This is when the gap between production capacity and market 
demand was greatest. The two maritime laws provided a new political measure 
to alleviate this risk. The shipping law aimed at the development of the domestic 
large ship market through the promotion of long distance shipping. The aim of 
the shipbuilding law was to cover the financial burden of builders by 
subsidization. In spite of this double protection most entrepreneurs still feared 
the risks. 
   Mitsubishi proceeded very cautiously. It designed its technological advance 
not as a single leap, but as a series of small jumps. It constructed the first steel 
vessel of 610 GT with a 483 Hps triple expansion engine in 1890. A small jump 
to the vessel of 1,592 GT (853 Hps) was achieved in 1895, and the second jump 
to 6,172 GT (3,847 Hps) in 1898. The third jump to a vessel of 13,454 GT with 
20,608 Hps 3 Parsons D. C. Turbine was carried out in 1908, after the company 
had experienced the construction of 9 vessels of the 6,000 GT class. It was a 
carefully prepared, long series of small jumps. Furthermore, these small jumps 
were accompanied by risk-hedging devices as exemplified by coal 
transportation in the first jump, and close ties with Nippon Mail Ship in the 
second jump.
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   Throughout the process the key factor working to Mitsubishi's advantage 
was the fact that it was a conglomerate. First of all, this factor was favorable to 
large investment. Next, demands for various machines raised by many of its 
branches constituted a sort of inner market. Mitsubishi took advantage of this 
inner market to hedge the risks of the first jump. Should the jump have ended 
in a failure, the resulting financial damage would have been dispersed to all the 
related branches and finally assumed by the Mitsubishi, and not solely by the 
Nagasaki Shipyard. If the jump was successful, then the upgraded engineering 
capability of the Nagasaki Shipyard would be to the advantage of every branch 
of the Mitsubishi conglomerate. The same argument can be applied to the 
relation between Nagasaki Shipyard and Nippon Mail Ship in the second jump. 
Here the role of Nippon Mail Ship functioned almost like a shipping branch of 
the Mitsubishi conglomerate. 
   Thus Mitsubishi demonstrated that a conglomerate under adequate 
government protection represented an appropriate form for a private firm of a 
latecomer country safely to venture into a risky business requiring the latest 
engineering techniques. 
   Changes following from World War I initiated a new era for Japanese 
business, in which engineering firms enjoyed abundant opportunities. In this 
situation, Kawasaki and to a lesser degree Ishikawajima drew upon their long 
accumulated engineering capability to follow the trail blazed by Mitsubishi, that 
is, the path of a conglomerate under government protection. Already established 
zaibatsu such as Sumitomo, Mitsui, and Furukawa adopted the same strategy, 
taking advantage of the engineering capability accumulated in their large 
machine shops for mines and metal refining plants. 
   Throughout the interwar period however, government protection was 
gradually shifting towards the munition industries. As a result, major 
engineering firms gradually developed a close relation with the army or the 
navy, leaving the unprotected and very risky engineering fields to medium-size 
firms in the middle section of the hierarchy. One such field was the mass 
production of passenger cars, where Ford and GM were dominant presences. 
While the army had a strong interest in the automobile, this interest was 
restricted to heavy vehicles for military use. It regarded passenger cars as a 
luxury consumer good that was in no way related to its military operations. 
   In the interwar period, many entrepreneurs and engineers who were 
personally enchanted by the motor car tried to enter into passenger car 
production. As with the efforts of Kobe Iron Works to break into iron steamer 
building however, the result was always a failure. But during that time two 
engineering firms in the middle of the hierarchy were advancing steadily
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approach towards the mass production system of passenger cars. One was 
Toyoda Automatic Loom Works, which had begun as a manufacturer of 
improved traditional looms at the bottom of the engineering hierarchy. The 
other was Tobata Casting, which had started by manufacturing malleable iron 
castings and internal combustion engines for fishing boats. Toyota Motor 
separated off from the former in 1937, and Nissan Motor from the latter in 1934. 
In 1935 Nissan began to produce a very small car called Datsun on a new line at 
the Yokohama Plant with a capacity of 10,000 cars per year. 
   However, just around this time the army and the government agreed to 
involve the two companies in the production of military trucks. Thus the 
establishment of a Japanese version of the mass production system for cars was 
postponed until after World War II. How they achieved this feat and overcame 
the big gap that existed between the large capacities of expensive, integrated 
plants and an extremely small market for their products is another story -one 
which in some ways resembles and in other way differs decisively from what has 
been described in this paper.
Notes
 1. A brief description on this movement is given in T. Nakaoka, "The European industrial 
   economy and the endogenous development in Asia" in Yamada Keiji, ed., The transfer of science 
  and technology between Europe and Asia, 1780-1880, (Kyoto: International Research Center for 
   Japanese Studies/IRCJS, 1993), 15-38. 
2. Nakanishi You (1982) and Kusumoto Juichi (1992) are good references for Nagasaki Iron Works. 
   A detailed description of the study of schooner building is found in the chapter 1 of Yamamoto 
  Kiyoshi (1994). 
3. Suzuki Jun, Meiji no Kikaikogyo (Engineering industry in the Meiji period), (Kyoto, 1996). Chapter 
   1 is an excellent study on this process. 
4. Nagasaki Iron Works changed its name four times after the Restoration : that is, Nagasaki 
   Shipyards, Nagasaki Manufacture, Nagasaki Engineering Branch and Nagasaki Shipbuilding 
   Dept.. This fact reflects the fluctuation in its orientation between general engineering works 
   and shipbuilding. Here we adopt its last name. It is same for Hyogo Shipbuilding Dept.
5. Teratani Takeaki (1979) 38-50. 
6. Suzuki Jun (1996), 50-52. 
7. An excellent survey of Westerners' shipyards in East Asia in the second half of the 19th century 
   is found in Frank Broeze, "The transfer of technology and science to Asia 1780-1880: Shipping 
   and Shipbuilding" in Yamada Keiji (1993), 117-139. 
8. Ishii Kenji (1995), 114-118. 
9. Teratani Takeaki (1979), 51-53. 
10. Suzuki Jun (1996), 62-64. Descriptions on Kirby and Kobe Iron Works in this paper owe to
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Ishikawajima Heavy Industries (1961), 278. 
Muroyama Yoshimasa (1981), 90-92. 
Kobusho (1896), 314. 
Zosen Kyokai (1911), 593; Ishikawajima Heavy Industries (1961), 236. 
Suzuki Jun (1996), Chapter 5. 
Inoue Yoichiro (1990) is a good reference with regard to the development of shipping and 
shipbuilding in the Meiji period. 
Suzuki Jun (1996), 68-69. 
Mitsubishi Shipbuilding Co. Nagasaki Shipyard (1928), 35. 
Ibid., 38-42. 
Shiota Taisuke (1938), 105-6. 
Suzuki Jun (1996), 70. 
Shiota Taisuke (1938), 119-122. 
Hitachi-maru (6,172 GT) and Awa-maru (6,309 GT). Technical aspects of the construction 
process of the former are analyzed in Nakaoka Tetsuro (1987). 
Shiota Taisuke (1938), 119-122. 
Nakaoka Tetsuro (1987). 
Yamamoto Kiyoshi (1994), 377. 
A representative of such analysis is Yamada Moritaro (1934). 
Ishikawajima Heavy Industries (1961), 305-12. 
Toyoda Loom Works did not directly develop into Toyota Motor. Though Toyoda Sakichi was 
the founder, he left his Works because his R & D policy was rejected by the executive board. In 
1926 he established with his son Toyoda Kiichiro Toyoda Automatic Loom Works. This is the 
parent company of Toyota Motor. 
Mitsubishi Automobile Manufacturing Co. (1993), 33. 
Ibid., 32-35 
Isuzu Motors Ltd. (1988), 3-13. 
Kawasaki manufactured two test vehicles of military truck in 1919. The next year the 
automobile section of the Kawasaki Shipyard was established. As early as 1921 its name was 
changed to the aircraft section. Japan Automobile Manufacturers' Association Inc. (1967), 327-
8.
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